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Discerning “indistinguishable” quantum systems
Adam Caulton∗
Abstract
In a series of recent papers, Simon Saunders, Fred Muller and Michael
Seevinck have collectively argued, against the folklore, that some non-trivial
version of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles is upheld in
quantum mechanics. They argue that all particles—fermions, paraparti-
cles, anyons, even bosons—may be weakly discerned by some physical re-
lation. Here I show that their arguments make illegitimate appeal to non-
symmetric, i.e. permutation-non-invariant, quantities, and that therefore
their conclusions do not go through. However, I show that alternative, sym-
metric quantities may be found to do the required work. I conclude that
the Saunders-Muller-Seevinck heterodoxy can be saved after all.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Getting clear on Leibniz’s Principle
What is the fate of Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles for quantum
mechanics? It depends, of course, on how the Principle is translated into modern
(enough) parlance for the evaluation to be made. Modern logic provides a frame-
work in which some natural regimentations may be articulated, which, even if
they would not have been of interest to Leibniz’s original project, are nevertheless
worthy of investigation in their own right.
One informal gloss of the Principle is that no two objects share all the same
properties. Grant that we may regiment by taking ‘object’ in the Fregean-Quinean
sense of an occupant of the first-order domain. Then what might count as a prop-
erty? If, for each first-order model, we universally quantify over the interpretations
afforded in that model to the distinguished predicates, then the Principle is con-
tingent. That is, in some models the non-logical vocabulary is expressive enough
to define identity; in others it is not. But this regimentation might be thought
to make a metaphysical principle too much a hostage to the fortunes of language.
Why only quantify over the properties for which we have the corresponding pred-
icates?
An alternative is to regiment the Principle so that, in each model, one gen-
eralises over all subsets of the first-order domain. The result is a (second-order)
logical truth, since for any object a there is its singleton {a}. But here I see at
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least two objections. First, sets are not properties. But no worries: for any subset
of the domain, there is at least one property to which it corresponds—namely, the
property of belonging to that subset. Thus generalisation over subsets may be
taken as covert generalisation over these properties at least, and discernibility by
these properties entails discernibility simpliciter. (All this, of course, only so long
as there are sets.) The second, more serious, objection is that the singleton sets
one discerns by are precisely as discernible as the objects that are their unique
members. In what sense, then, is it an achievement to have discerned those ob-
jects with those sets? In other words: when the properties one quantifies over
correspond to the subsets of the first-order domain, the Principle becomes trivial.
That should come as no surprise—as I said, it is a logical truth—but it cannot be
the regimentation of Leibniz’s Principle that we are looking for.
The solution—or, at least, the solution I favour for the purposes of this paper—
is to retreat to generalising over the interpretations assigned to the distinguished
predicates, but suitably to relativise the Principle to the appropriate collection
of properties and relations: namely, those for which the distinguished predicates
stand. The Principle now reads: “No two objects share all the same properties
expressible in the language.” One may then, if it is so desired, recover an absolute
version of the Principle by ensuring that each property or relation taken to exist
has its corresponding predicate in the non-logical vocabulary—assuming such a
thing possible.
With this regimentation, the Principle may be given an explicit first-order log-
ical form. For each predicate, one forms a biconditional expressing co-satisfaction
for x and y. If the predicate is 2-place or more, one universally generalises over
the other argument places, and makes sure that there is a bi-conditional for each
argument position of the predicate. The conjunction of all such bi-conditionals
is then asserted to be co-extensional with ‘x = y’, and we have a (putative) ex-
plicit definition of identity. The result is the Hilbert-Bernays (1934) axiom, made
famous by Quine (e.g. 1960) and revived by Saunders (2003a, 2003b, 2006):
∀x∀y
{
x = y ≡
[
. . . ∧ (Fix ≡ Fiy) ∧ . . .
. . . ∧ ∀z ((Gjxz ≡ Gjyz) ∧ (Gjzx ≡ Gjzy)) ∧ . . .
. . . ∧ ∀z∀w
(
(Hkxzw ≡ Hkyzw) ∧ (Hkzxw ≡ Hkzyw)
∧ (Hkzwx ≡ Hkzwy)
)
∧ . . .
]}
(HB)
Of course, one must assume that there are finitely many properties and relations,
unless one cares to appeal to infinitary languages or some form of parameterization
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(cf. Caulton and Butterfield 2011, §2.1). The question whether the Principle is
true in any theory can now be made precise. If one takes a theory to be a set T
of sentences, the question is: Does T logically entail (HB)? If one takes a theory
to be a set M of models, the question is: Is (HB) true in every model in M?
1.2 The folklore
Let T = quantum mechanics, or M = the models of quantum mechanics. Is (HB)
a logical consequence of T , or true in all models in M—at least when the first-
order variables are restricted to quantum particles? Until about eight years ago,
the folklore has been that quantum particles cannot be discerned, so that Leibniz’s
Principle fails.
To explain this in more detail, it will be clearest to start with an even earlier
folklore, inherited from the founders of quantum mechanics. This folklore has it
that Pauli’s exclusion principle for fermions—or better: symmetrization for bosons
and anti-symmetrization for fermions—means that:
(a) bosons can be in the same state; but
(b) fermions cannot be; so that
(c) Leibniz’s Principle holds for fermions but not bosons.
(For an expression of these three views, see e.g. Weyl 1928, 241.) In fact, these
claims can and should be questioned. Under scrutiny, and certain interpretative
assumptions, each of (a) to (c) fail, and it seems that Leibniz’s Principle is pan-
demically false in quantum mechanics.
For first: under the standard interpretation of the formalism,1 any two bosons
or any two fermions of the same species are absolutely indiscernible, in the sense
that no quantity (“observable”) exists which can discern them.2 For any assembly
of fermions or bosons, and any state of that assembly (appropriately (anti-) sym-
metrized), and any two particles in the assembly, the two particles’ probabilities for
all single-particle quantities are equal; and so are appropriate corresponding two-
particle conditional probabilities, including probabilities using conditions about a
third constituent. In more technical language: according to the usual procedure
of extracting the reduced density operator of a particle by tracing out the states
1I will not question this widespread interpretation of the formalism here, although, like Ear-
man (ms.) and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011), I am greatly suspicious of it.
2For a discussion of absolute discernibility, see e.g. Saunders (2003b), Muller and Saunders
(2008), and Caulton and Butterfield (2011).
for all the other particles in the assembly, we obtain the result that for all (anti-)
symmetrized states of the assembly, one obtains equal reduced density operators
for every particle. (Margenau 1944; French & Redhead 1988; Butterfield 1993;
Huggett 1999; 2003; Massimi 2001; French & Krause 2006, 150-73.)
Thus not only can fermions ‘be in the same state’, just as much as bosons can
be—pace the informal slogan form of Pauli’s exclusion principle—also, a pair of
indistinguishable particles of either species must be in the same state. This result
appears to entail that Leibniz’s Principle is pandemically false in quantum theory.3
1.3 A new folklore?
Such was the folklore until eight years ago. But this folklore has also recently
been called into question by Simon Saunders, Fred Muller and Michael Seevinck.
For (building on the Hilbert-Bernays account of identity) there are ways of distin-
guishing particles that outstrip the notion of a quantum state for a particle (and
its assocated probabilities, including conditional probabilities)—and yet which are
supported by quantum theory. That is: the folklore has overlooked predicates
on the right-hand side of (HB) which may, after all, sanction the right-to-left
implication.
For as the Hilbert-Bernays account teaches us, two objects can be discerned
even if they share all their monadic properties and their relations to all other
objects—and even if any relation that they hold to one another is held symmet-
rically. That is: they can be discerned weakly.4 Thus if, for some relation R and
two objects a and b, we have that Rab and Rba, then a and b must be distinct if
either Raa or Rbb (or both) fails.
It remains to provide such a relation that is legitimate within quantum me-
chanics. This task was undertaken in its most general form for fermions by Muller
and Saunders (2008), and for all particles by Muller and Seevinck (2009). (This
work built upon an original suggestion by Saunders (2003b), which took inspira-
tion from the fact that two particles in the spin singlet state may be said to have
opposite spin (or to have vanishing combined total spin) without having to pick a
spin direction.) In the following two sections (Sections 2 and 3), I will appraise the
results in these two papers. I will conclude that Saunders, Muller and Seevinck
were largely correct in their general conclusion that weakly discerning relations
may be found, but that their proofs make incorrect assumptions—incorrect, that
3It may be of interest to note that these results can also be shown to hold for paraparticles, so
long as one follows Messiah and Greenberg’s (1964) recommendation of working with ‘generalised
rays’ (i.e. multi-dimensional subspaces) instead of one-dimensional rays; see Huggett (2003).
4The terminology originates with Quine (1960).
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is, on their own terms—about which aspects of the quantum formalism represent
genuine physical structure. I will propose a friendly amendment to the Saunders-
Muller-Seevinck results in Section 4, and secure the fact that particles are always
weakly discernible, whether they be bosons, fermions or paraparticles.
2 Muller and Saunders on discernment
2.1 The Muller-Saunders result
Here I briefly present the main result contained in Muller and Saunders (2008).
First I follow these authors in establishing three important distinctions in the way
that particles may be discerned.
1. Absolute vs. relative vs. weak discernment. The first distinction relates to the
logical form of the predicates used to discern the particles. As we have seen,
all fermions and bosons are absolutely indiscernible; they are also relatively
indiscernible. Thus our only hope is to discern them weakly.
2. Mathematical vs. physical discernment. Of course, it is crucial that the prop-
erties and relations used to discern the particles be physical : we cannot
appeal to elements of the theory’s mathematical formalism which have no
representational function. Thus, for example, we cannot discern two particles
in an assembly merely by appealing to the fact that the Hilbert space for that
assembly is a tensor product of two copies of a factor Hilbert space. For all
we know, this representative structure may be redundant; there may in fact
only be one particle. So we must instead appeal to quantities in the formal-
ism which genuinely represent physical quantities. Like Muller, Saunders and
Seevinck, I call this sort of legitimate discernment ‘physical discernment’. I
call instances of spurious discernment ‘mathematical discernment’—Muller
and Saunders instead use the phrase ‘lexicon discernment’; but it is impor-
tant to distinguish between mathematical objects (like Hilbert spaces) and
mathematical language. Thus I restrict (HB) above to contain only physical
predicates; mathematical predicates (such as set membership: ‘∈’) are not
to be included.
3. Categorical vs. probabilistic discernment. The final distinction relates to the
assumptions required to secure the discernment. Muller and Saunders call an
instance of discernment ‘categorical’ just in case it requires no appeal to the
Born rule, and ‘probabilistic’ otherwise. The main advantage of categorical,
as opposed to probabilistic, discernment is that by by-passing probabilistic
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notions its validity need not wait on any solution to the quantum measure-
ment problem. However, this advantage is in my view only slight, since surely
any solution to the measurement problem must anyway secure at least an ap-
proximate vindication of the Born rule. Here the restriction is not on (HB)
but the theory taken to entail it. Categorical discernment means entailment
by quantum mechanics without the Born rule as a postulate.
We are now in a position to state the main Muller-Saunders result:
(SMS1) Fermions are categorically, weakly, physically discernible.
Reconstruction of proof (cf. Muller and Saunders 2008, 536): We consider an
assembly of only two fermions, so our Hilbert space is A(H ⊗ H); the result is
easily extendible for more than two particles (cf. Muller and Saunders 2008, 534).
Select some complete set of projection operators {Ei},
∑
iEi = 1, for the single-
particle Hilbert space H and define Pij := Ei − Ej . Then define P
(1)
ij := Pij ⊗ 1
and P
(2)
ij := 1 ⊗ Pij , where the superscripts are labels for particles 1 and 2. We
then define the following relation:
Rt(x, y) iff
∑
i,j
P
(x)
ij P
(y)
ij ρ = tρ, (1)
where t ∈ R, ρ is the density operator representing the state of the assembly, and
the indices i, j range over the projectors Ei.
First we prove that 1 and 2 are categorically and weakly discerned by Rt for
some value of t. To see that the discernment is categorical, it can be shown
(cf. Muller and Saunders 2008, 533) that, with dim(H) > 2, for every state |Ψ〉 ∈
A(H⊗H), ∑
i,j
P
(1)
ij P
(2)
ij |Ψ〉 =
∑
i,j
P
(2)
ij P
(1)
ij |Ψ〉 = −2|Ψ〉 (2)
and ∑
i,j
(
P
(1)
ij
)2
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i,j
(
P
(2)
ij
)2
|Ψ〉 = 2(d− 1)|Ψ〉 , (3)
where d = dim(H). Thus every state of the assembly is an eigenstate of the
operators used in the definition of Rt; and so we do not need to assume the Born
rule. Rt therefore promises to provide categorical discernment.
To see that Rt discerns the particles weakly for some t, note that Rt(1, 1) and
Rt(2, 2) iff t = 2(d − 1), whereas Rt(1, 2) and Rt(2, 1) only if t = −2.
5 So the
relations R2(d−1) and R−2 both serve to weakly discern particles 1 and 2.
5Remember that ‘1’ and ‘2’ serve as particle labels in the expressions ‘Rt(1, 2)’, etc.
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Finally, it remains to be shown that Rt is a physical relation. I turn to Muller
and Saunder’s criteria (2008, pp. 527-8):
(Req1) Physical meaning. All properties and relations should be trans-
parently defined in terms of physical states and operators that corre-
spond to physical magnitudes, as in [the weak projection postulate],6
in order for the properties and relations to be physically meaningful.
(Req2) Permutation invariance. Any property of one particle is a prop-
erty of any other; relations should be permutation-invariant, so binary
relations are symmetric and either reflexive or irreflexive.
(Req2) is clearly true of Rt. (Req1) is also true of Rt, provided that: (i) the projec-
tors Ei are physically meaningful; and (ii) the physical meaningfulness of operators
is preserved under mathematical operations; for our purposes these must include:
arithmetical operations, i.e. addition and multiplication; and tensor multiplication
with the identity. (Note: Muller and Saunders take (i) (along with (Req2)) to be
sufficient to establish that Rt is a physical relation (2008, 534-5). However, it is
clear that (ii) is also required.) 
2.2 Commentary on the Muller-Saunders proof
I take no issue with Muller and Saunders’ claim that their relations Rt provide
categorical and weak discernment. However, I question whether the relations Rt
may properly be considered physical. I take no issue with the idea that projectors
per se are physically meaningful (like Muller and Saunders, I agree that these can
be considered to represent specific experimental questions with a yes/no answer);
but Rt is defined in terms of non-symmetric projectors Ei ⊗ 1, etc. And it is
compulsory—i.e., a necessary condition for representing a physical quantity—that
the quantities obey the Indistinguishability Postulate (IP), which demands that all
physical quantities be permutation invariant. (Cf. Messiah and Greenberg 1964.)
This brings us to my criticism of (Req2), which has two components. First:
it misapplies the correct idea that physical quantities must be symmetric. By
requiring only that the relations defined from the quantum mechanical quantities
be symmetric, (Req2) fails to rule out use of quantum mechanical quantities which
may themselves be non-symmetric. To take a simple illustration of this point: ‘x
6The weak projection postulate is effectively Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen’s (1935) reality
condition that the assembly’s being in an eigenstate of any self-adjoint operator Q with eigen-
value q is a sufficient condition for the assembly’s possessing the property corresponding to the
quantity’s Q having value q. This is an interpretative principle, which, like Muller and Saunders
(2008) and Muller and Seevinck (2009), I take for granted.
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is particle 1 and y is particle 2’ clearly fails to be a physical relation, both in the
proper sense, and in terms of (Req2). But the relation ‘x is particle 1 and y is
particle 2, or x is particle 2 and y is particle 1’ is equally unphysical, yet it does
satisfy (Req2).
It may be replied that this is where (Req1) comes in. But this brings us
to the second component of my criticism of (Req2): it is redundant. For it is
anyway necessary for a quantity to be symmetric to satisfy (Req1), since any
non-symmetric quantity contravenes IP, and therefore cannot represent a ‘physical
magnitude’. Indeed: since (Req1) already demands that the quantities be physical,
why do we need any further requirement?
It may be objected on behalf of Muller and Saunders that, while the quantities
P
(1)
ij and P
(2)
ij indeed fail to be symmetric, the quantities defined in terms of them—
namely, the
∑
i,j P
(x)
ij P
(y)
ij —are symmetric. This is indeed true:
∑
i,j
(
P
(1)
ij
)2
=∑
i,j
(
P
(2)
ij
)2
= 2(d− 1)1⊗ 1 and
∑
i,j P
(1)
ij P
(2)
ij =
∑
i,j P
(2)
ij P
(1)
ij = 2(
∑
iEi ⊗Ei −
1⊗1), where 1 is the identity on H. (Note that the restrictions of both quantities
to the anti-symmetric sector, A(H ⊗ H), are multiples of the identity on that
sector.) But I see no force in the objection: the physical significance of these
quantities was supposed to rest on their being constructions out of quantities like
Ei ⊗ 1; yet it is precisely these quantities which run afoul of IP.
Without any convincing account of the physical significance of the building
blocks of the
∑
i,j P
(x)
ij P
(y)
ij , these quantities must be assessed for their physical
significance on their own terms. But, since they are all multiples of the identity
on the assembly’s state space, this significance is trivial: they all correspond to
experimental questions which yield the same answer on every physical state.7
This triviality is a problem for Muller and Saunders, since it blocks the Rt from
being physical relations. If we now attempt to redefine the Rt in a way that avoids
misleading reference to the fraudulently physical quantities P
(x)
ij we obtain:
Rt(x, y) iff (x = y and 2(d− 1)ρ = tρ) or (x 6= y and (−2)ρ = tρ) (4)
This is equivalent to:
Rt(x, y) iff (x = y and t = 2(d− 1)) or (x 6= y and t = −2). (5)
So long as we have a definition of the Rt in terms of quantities that seems (i.e. from
the point of view of the syntax) to treat the x = y and x 6= y cases equally, the
fact that a different quantity (i.e. a different multiple of the identity) underlies
7I am very grateful to Nick Huggett for discussions about this point.
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each of these two cases is tolerable. (In just the same way, Rxy and Rxx are
strictly speaking different predicates—since one refers to a relation while the other
refers to a monadic property—yet it is normal to treat any instance of Rxx as a
special instance of Rxy. Indeed: weak discernment relies on this being legitimate.)
But since the quantities
∑
i,j P
(x)
ij P
(y)
ij must be taken at face value—that is, as
nothing but multiples of the identity—we must adopt definition (5) over definition
(1), and definition (5) is hopelessly gerrymandered and unphysical. Thus Muller
and Saunders’ proof that any two fermions are physically discernible does not go
through.
In Section 4, I propose an alternative relation which will discern fermions physi-
cally and weakly, though not categorically. But first let me address the main results
in Muller and Seevinck (2009).
3 Muller and Seevinck on discernment
3.1 The Muller-Seevinck result
Muller and Seevinck use a similar framework to Muller and Saunders (2008):
specifically, they carry over the three distinctions between kinds of discernment
presented above, and the two requirements for physical significance, (Req1) and
(Req2).8 There are two main results to discuss: the first concerns spinless parti-
cles with infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces; the second concerns spinning systems
with finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
I begin with their Theorem 1. (Note that I rephrase their Theorems; cf. Muller
and Seevinck 2009, 189.)
(SMS2) In an assembly with Hilbert space
⊗N
L2(R3) and the associated
algebra of quantities B(
⊗N
L2(R3)), any two particles are categor-
ically, weakly, physically discernible.
Reconstruction of proof (cf. Muller and Seevinck 2009, 189): Again, for sim-
plicity’s sake, I restrict attention to the case of two particles (N = 2). Let Q be
the position operator for a single particle in some dimension (say x), and let be P
8Muller and Seevinck (2009, pp. 185-6) entertain adding a third requirement, to the effect
that discernment by a relation is ‘authentic’ only if it is irreducible to monadic properties, and
discernment by a monadic property is ‘authentic’ only if it is irreducible to relations. They reject
this extra requirement, as do I; but my reason is different. My reason is that physical meaning
(embodied in (Req1)) is all one could, and should, reasonably ask for—so long as that is taken
to entail the requirement that the Indistinguishability Postulate is satisfied; cf. my commentary
of Muller and Saunders’ proof in Section 2.
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be the momentum operator in that same dimension. (So Q and P are (partially)
defined on L2(R3); and I shall not go into detail about the partialness of the do-
mains of definition, which are adequately discussed by Muller and Seevinck.) Now
define Q(1) := Q ⊗ 1 and Q(2) := 1 ⊗ Q, and P (1) := P ⊗ 1 and P (2) := 1 ⊗ P ,
where 1 is the identity on L2(R3).
We may now define a relation C as follows:
C(x, y) iff [P (x), Q(y)]ρ = cρ, for some c 6= 0 , (6)
where ρ is the density operator representing the state of the assembly. Now for
every state we have C(1, 1) and C(2, 2), since [P (1), Q(1)] = [P (2), Q(2)] = −i~1⊗1.
And we also have ¬C(1, 2) and ¬C(2, 1), since [P (1), Q(2)] = [P (2), Q(1)] = 0. Thus
C weakly discerns particles 1 and 2. This discernment is categorical, since C holds
or not categorically, i.e. without probabilistic assumptions. And the discernment
is physical, since C meets (Req1) and (Req2). 
Commentary. First of all I note that the restriction in (SMS2), that each
particles’ state space be L2(R3) should count as no real restriction, since all real
particles have spatial degrees of freedom. Second: since the discernment is cate-
gorical, it is no restriction that the full (i.e. un-symmetrized) Hilbert space is used
in the proof: the proof carries over for all restrictions to symmetry sectors.
As in Section 2, again I take no issue with the claim that the discernment is
weak and categorical, but I do deny that it is physical. The reason is the same as for
Muller and Saunders (2008): namely, the proof uses unphysical quantities. (Thus
I deny that (Req1) is satisfied.) Again we demand not just that the discerning
relation be symmetric, but also that it be defined using only physical—a fortiori,
only symmetric—quantities. And Q(x) and P (x), despite their tantalising intuitive
interpretation, do not count as physical quantities.
I now turn to Muller and Seevinck’s second main Theorem:
(SMS3) In an assembly with a finite-dimensional Hilbert space
⊗N
C2s+1,
where s ∈ {1
2
, 1, 3
2
, . . .} and the associated algebra of quantities
B(
⊗N
C
2s+1), any two particles are categorically, weakly, physically
discernible using only their spin degrees of freedom.
Reconstruction of proof (cf. Muller and Seevinck 2009, 193-7): Again I restrict
attention to the case of two particles (N = 2). Let S = σxi + σyj + σkk be the
quantity representing a single particle’s spin (so S acts on C2s+1). Then we define
S1 := S⊗ 1 and S2 := 1⊗ S, and the relation T as follows:
T (x, y) iff for all ρ ∈ D(C2s+1 ⊗ C2s+1), |(Sx + Sy)|
2ρ = 4s(s+ 1)~2ρ. (7)
Recall that |S|2 = s(s+1)~21; this entails that |2S1|
2 = |2S2|
2 = 4s(s+1)~21⊗1; so
T (1, 1) and T (2, 2) both hold. Meanwhile, |(S1+S2)|
2 = |S|2⊗1+1⊗|S|2+2S⊗S =
11
2s(s+1)~21⊗1+2S⊗S. But the eigenvalue spectrum of |(S1+S2)|
2 never exceeds
(2s)(2s+1)~2 < 4s(s+1)~2, so ¬T (1, 2) and ¬T (2, 1) both hold. This discernment
is clearly weak. It is categorical, since it relies on no probabilistic assumptions,
and it is physical, since T satisfies (Req1) and (Req2). 
3.2 Commentary on the Muller-Seevinck result
I note that, in order to put the physical significance of T on firmer ground, Muller
and Seevinck extend the EPR reality condition (cf. footnote 6) to a necessary and
sufficient condition, which they call the ‘strong property postulate’. According to
this postulate, the assembly possesses the property corresponding to the quantity’s
Q having value q if and only if the assembly’s state is an eigenstate of the self-
adjoint operator Q, with eigenvalue q. This strengthening is required to establish
that the assembly does not possess combined total spin
√
4s(s+ 1)~ when it not
in an eigenstate of the total spin operator.
Freedom from this stronger reality condition can be bought at the price of a
concession to settle for probabilistic rather than categorical discernment. For we
may define the new relation T ′:
T ′(x, y) iff Tr
(
ρ|(Sx + Sy)|
2
)
= 4s(s+ 1)~2. (8)
It is clear that T ′ discerns iff the “de-modalized” version of T discerns. But the
definition of T ′ involves a commitment to the Born rule, so T ′’s discernment is
probabilistic. This trade-off between the strong reality condition and the Born
rule will also be a feature of my proposals in the following section.
The previous objection I levelled against (SMS1) and (SMS2) appears to be
valid here too. For, even though |(S1 + S2)|
2 and |2S1|
2 = |2S2|
2 are symmetric,
once again their building blocks (S1 and S2) are not, and (it may be argued) it is
only when defined in terms of these components that T is not a gerrymandered
relation.
However, my usual objection does not hold in this case. On the contrary, it
seems reasonable to take T (x, y) as a natural physical relation, even though its
explicit mathematical form depends on whether x = y or x 6= y. To see this, it
should be enough that T can be parsed in English as the relation: ‘the combined
total spin of x and y has the magnitude
√
4s(s+ 1)~ in all states’. Combined total
spin is a symmetric quantity, and it has obvious physical significance. Therefore I
do not take issue with the discerning relation being physical.
But I have two different objections in this case: one mild, the other more
serious. The mild objection is that the relation T is different in a significant way
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from the previous relations Rt and C. While Rt and C both apply to a given state
of the assembly, the definition of T involves quantification over all states of the
assembly. It is therefore a modal relation. But appeal to modal relations in this
context is problematic, since it threatens to trivialise the search for a discerning
relation for every state. It would turn out that Leibniz’s Principle is necessarily
true if it is possibly true: a result that is at best controversial (though Saunders
2003b seems to endorse it, taking (HB) as an explicit definition of identity, as
Quine 1960 also suggests).
(Note, incidentally, that the use of modal relations cannot be criticised on the
grounds that it assumes haecceitism. It is natural—at least in standard practice—
to use Hilbert space labels to cross-identify systems between states, and this seems
to have a whiff of haecceitism about it. However, this cross-identification strategy
does not entail haecceitism, since the quantification over states may be restricted to
the (anti-) symmetric sectors, in which all states are already permutation-invariant,
so that the issue of haecceitism is moot.)
This mild objection is easily met. We simply drop the quantification over states
in the definition of T . If we do this, then the (unquantified) right-hand side of
the definition (7) is still satisfied iff x = y, for all states ρ. We thereby drop the
modal involvement. Thus we define a new relation, to be parsed as ‘the combined
total spin of x and y has the magnitude
√
4s(s+ 1)~’. The discernment remains
categorical, since no probabilistic assumptions have been made.
The serious problem is that (SMS3) is only applicable to assemblies whose con-
stituent particles have non-zero spin. This might seem to be only a mild omission,
since the only elementary spin-zero particle that actually exists is the Higgs boson,
and for a treatment of that we turn to quantum field theory. However, it would be
nice to establish the discernibility of quantum particles for all values of spin, not
just for the sake of the Higgs boson, but for the sake of any hypothetical particle,
actual or merely possible.
To sum up: the same problem beleaguers the first two results (SMS1) and
(SMS2), which aim to demonstrate the discernibility of (respectively) fermions
and any particles with spatial degrees of freedom. The problem is that they both
appeal to quantities which, in virtue of contravening IP, are non-physical. The
third result, (SMS3), avoids this problem (modulo dropping some unnecessary
modal involvement). However, it does not apply to particles with zero-spin. I now
turn to my proposal for discerning any species of particle, for any value of spin.
13
4 A better way to discern particles
Muller and Saunders’ Theorem 3 (539-40) contains the germ of a better way to
secure discernment; i.e. a way free of the criticisms discussed in Sections 2 and 3.
This section develops the germ. I proceed in stages. First I outline the basic idea,
and propose a relation which weakly and physically discerns two particles in any
two-particle assembly, using statistical variance. Then I investigate discernment
for heterodox state spaces, in which particles may have definite position, and give
a relation that will weakly in physically discern there too. Finally, I propose a
relation that weakly and physically discerns any two particles in an assembly of
any number of particles.
4.1 The basic idea
My basic idea is that particles may be discerned by taking advantage of anti-
correlations between single-particle states. In the case of fermions, this is ‘easy’
because of Pauli exclusion: in any basis the occupation number for any single-
particle state never exceeds one. In the case of the other particles, it is more
tricky, due to the fact that states for non-fermionic particles may have as terms
product states with equal factors. In these states, two or more particles are fully
correlated, so there does not seem to be any quantum property or relation which
would discern them. The solution is to change the basis to one in which anti-
correlations appear with non-zero amplitude; the quantity associated with this
new basis can then form the basis of a discerning relation.
Thus my strategy is discernment through anti-correlations, and the finding
of anti-correlations through dispersion. For any state in which two particles are
fully correlated, there will be dispersion in some other basis; in particular, the
dispersion will involve branches with non-zero-amplitudes in which the particles
are anti-correlated.
4.2 The variance operator
For simplicity, I focus exclusively on the two particle case. We may take the
assembly Hilbert space to be L2(R3) ⊗ L2(R3), but my results still carry over if
we restrict to a symmetry sector, or add additional (e.g. spin) degrees of freedom.
Anti-correlations between single-particle states in an eigenbasis for some single-
particle quantity Amay be indicated by means of the following ‘standard deviation’
14
operator:
∆A :=
1
2
(A⊗ 1− 1⊗A) . (9)
Actually, I will use its square ∆2A, the ‘variance’ operator, which, like ∆A, is self-
adjoint (since A is). Unlike ∆A, ∆
2
A is a symmetric operator, so it is in line
with the Indistinguishability Postulate (IP), and is therefore eligible to represent a
physical quantity. (∆A fails to be symmetric, since it is sent to minus itself under
a permutation.)
I also introduce the symmetric quantity A, which may be viewed as the statis-
tical mean of A, taken over the two particles:
A :=
1
2
(A⊗ 1+ 1⊗ A) . (10)
Note that the over-line does not indicate an expectation value: A is an operator.
By similarly defining A2 = 1
2
(A2 ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ A2) we can express the variance
operator more suggestively:
∆2A =
1
4
(A⊗ 1− 1⊗A)2
=
1
4
(
A2 ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ A2 − 2A⊗ A
)
=
1
2
(
A2 − A⊗ A
)
(11)
and
∆2A =
1
4
(
A2 ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ A2 − 2A⊗ A
)
=
1
2
(
A2 ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ A2
)
−
1
4
(
A2 ⊗ 1+ 2A⊗A + 1⊗ A2
)
= A2 −A
2
. (12)
It is the latter equation (12) which justifies the term ‘variance’ for ∆2A and
‘standard deviation’ for ∆A. But note again that it is not the (c-numbered) sta-
tistical variance of A over a given wavefunction; it is the variance of the operator
A over the two particles: ∆2A is itself still an operator. The former equation (11)
makes it most clear that ∆2A measures the anti-correlation between each of the two
particles’ A-eigenstates. In particular, for any state all of whose terms are product
states with equal factors in the A-basis:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck|φk〉 ⊗ |φk〉 , (13)
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where
A|φk〉 = ak|φk〉 , (14)
it may be checked that the variance has eigenvalue zero.
In general, however, a state with anti-correlations will not be an eigenstate of
∆2A. For a generic state-vector
|Φ〉 =
∑
ij
cij|φi〉 ⊗ |φj〉 (15)
we have
∆2A|Φ〉 =
1
4
∑
ij
cij (ai − aj)
2 |φi〉 ⊗ |φj〉 (16)
so that 〈
∆2A
〉
:= 〈Φ|∆2A|Φ〉
=
1
4
∑
ij
|cij|
2 (ai − aj)
2
. (17)
If we assume that A is non-degenerate (i.e., ai = aj implies i = j), then it is clear
from (17) that there is a positive contribution to the value of
〈
∆2A
〉
from every
anti-correlation that has a non-zero amplitude.
4.3 Variance provides a discerning relation
If a two-particle state has anti-correlations in a single-particle quantity A, we can
build a symmetric, irreflexive relation which discerns them. The main idea is: if
the expectation of the variance operator is non-zero, then this can be expressed as
a relation between the two particles which neither particle bears to itself.
Following Muller & Saunders (2008) and Muller & Seevinck (2009), we define
the operators
A(1) := A⊗ 1 ; A(2) := 1⊗ A . (18)
These quantities, being non-symmetric, are unphysical, but they can be used to
define physical quantities: note, for example, that ∆A ≡
1
2
(
A(1) −A(2)
)
and A ≡
1
2
(
A(1) + A(2)
)
. We then define the relation R as follows:
R(A, x, y) iff
1
4
(
A(x) − A(y)
)2
ρ 6= 0 . (19)
In English: R(A, x, y) holds for the state ρ if and only if ρ is not an eigenstate
of the absolute difference between x’s and y’s operator A, with eigenvalue zero.
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Here the variable A ranges over single-particle quantities and x and y range over
particles. This definition implies that R(A, 1, 2) iff R(A, 2, 1), iff ∆2Aρ 6= 0, and
¬R(A, 1, 1) and ¬R(A, 2, 2). So R(A, x, y) is symmetric and irreflexive for each
A. If ∆2A does not anihilate ρ, then we have R(A, 1, 2) and R(A, 2, 1); so in this
case R(A, x, y) weakly discerns particles 1 and 2. Moreover, the discernment is
categorical.
The question remains whether this discernment is physical. I claim that it is,
since the quantity 1
4
(
A(x) − A(y)
)2
, which is symmetric, can be understood as a
measure of anti-correlations between x and y for the single-particle quantity A—
i.e., a measure of difference between x’s and y’s values for A. Thus it is no surprise
that 1
4
(
A(x) − A(y)
)2
= 0 for x = y; for no object can take a value for any quantity
that is different from itself. I claim that, so long as the single-particle operator
A has physical significance, so does 1
4
(
A(x) − A(y)
)2
= 0. I emphasize that the
physical meaning of 1
4
(
A(x) − A(y)
)2
= 0 should not be thought of as depending
on A(1) or A(2)’s having physical meaning.
There is an important analogy here with relative distance. The relative distance
between particle x and particle y need not be thought of as deriving its meaning
from the absolute positions of x and y, even though the mathematical formalism
of our theory may indeed allow us to define the relative distance in terms of
these absolute positions. We need not take these mathematical definitions as
representative of any physical fact, since we are not forced to admit that an element
of the theory’s formalism which has a physical correlate also has physical correlates
for all of its mathematical building blocks. This is because these mathematical
building blocks may contain redundant structure which is not transmitted to all
of their by-products. Such is the case of relative distance. And in fact, relative
distance is more than an analogy: for (squared) relative distance is an instance of
∆2A, if we set A = Q, the single-particle position operator.
Note that an additional assumption is required to transmit physical significance
from 1
4
(
A(x) −A(y)
)2
= 0 to R(A, x, y): we need to assume Muller and Seevinck’s
‘strong property postulate’. Recall that this states that any physical quantity of
the assembly takes a certain value if and only if the assembly is in the appropriate
eigenstate for that physical quantity’s corresponding operator. What is important
here is the ‘only if’ component of the biconditional: this enables us to say that the
difference in x’s and y’s values for A is non-zero just in case the assembly is not
in the eigenstate with eigenvalue zero—including when the assembly is not in an
eigenstate at all.
I summarise the foregoing discussion in the following Lemmas:
Lemma 1 For all two-particle assemblies, and all single-particle quantities A, the
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relation R(A, x, y) has physical significance if A does, on the assumption of
the strong property postulate.
Lemma 2 For each state ρ of an assembly of two particles, and each single-particle
quantity A, the relation R(A, x, y) discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly, cate-
gorically and physically if and only if ∆2Aρ 6= 0, on the assumption of the
strong property postulate.
Proofs: See above. 
As with (SMS3), in the previous Section, we can instead forego the strong
property postulate and instead take advantage of the Born rule, to settle for prob-
abilistic discernment. To do so we define the relation R′ as follows:
R′(A, x, y) iff
1
4
Tr
[
ρ
(
A(x) −A(y)
)2]
6= 0 . (20)
Similar considerations to those above entail thatR′(A, 1, 2) iffR′(A, 2, 1), iff 〈∆2A〉 6=
0. And ¬R(A, 1, 1) and ¬R(A, 2, 2). So R(A, x, y) weakly discerns particles 1 and
2 just in case 〈∆2A〉 6= 0. Thus:
Lemma 3 For all single-particle quantities A, the relation R′(A, x, y) has physical
significance if A does, on the assumption of the Born rule.
Lemma 4 For each state ρ of the assembly, and each single-particle quantity A,
the relation R′(A, x, y) discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly, probabilistically
and physically, if and only if 〈∆2A〉 6= 0 for that state.
Proofs: See above. 
4.4 Discernment for all two-particle states
So far we have seen that two particles in a state with non-zero variance in some
single-particle quantity A—i.e. two particles which are anti-correlated in A—may
be discerned. To guarantee discernment in all two-particle states it remains to be
shown that, for any such state, there will be some single-particle quantity whose
eigenbasis has anti-correlations. In fact I prove a stronger result: namely that
there is some single-particle quantity which discerns the two particles in all states
of the assembly. Moreover, this quantity is familiar: it is position; and since all
particles have spatial degrees of freedom, it will be a quantity that will always be
available to discern.
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Theorem 1 For each state ρ of an assembly of two particles, the relationR(Q, x, y)
discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly, categorically and physically, where Q is the
single-particle position operator, on the assumption of the strong property
postulate.
Proof: We assume the strong property postulate. From Lemma 2, we know
that R(Q, x, y) discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly, categorically and physically, in
the state ρ if and only if ∆2Qρ 6= 0. Let us first consider only pure states, and later
generalise to all states.
Pure states. Since we are working in the position representation, we use wave-
functions rather than state-vectors or density operators. The most general form
for the wavefunction of the assembly is
Ψ(x,y) =
∑
ij
cijφi(x)φj(y) , (21)
where the φi are an orthonormal basis for L
2(R3). (We assume zero spin, but the
proof is trivially extended for any non-zero value for spin.) Now
(∆2QΨ)(x,y) =
∑
ij
cij
(
x2φi(x)φj(y) + φi(x)y
2φj(y)− 2xφi(x).yφj(y)
)
=
(∑
ij
cijφi(x)φj(y)
)
(x− y)2
= Ψ(x,y)(x− y)2 (22)
(cf. Equation (16)). This is the zero function only if Ψ(x,y) = 0 whenever x 6= y.
But then it cannot be represented in L2(R3) ⊗ L2(R3), since it is not a function.
Here I appeal to the fact that no wavefunction is “infinitely peaked” at the diagonal
points of the configuration space. (The necessary Ψ can be written as a measure:
Ψ(x,y) = f(x)δ(3)(x− y), for some function f ∈ L2(R3). I return to this point
in Theorem 3, below.) We may conclude that (∆2QΨ)(x,y) 6= 0. It follows that
∆2Q|Ψ〉〈Ψ| 6= 0.
Mixed states. We extend to density operators by taking convex combinations
of (not necessarily othogonal) projectors. We have that
∆2Q
(∑
i
pi|Ψi〉〈Ψi|
)
=
∑
i
pi∆
2
Q|Ψi〉〈Ψi| 6= 0 (23)
since both the pi and the spectrum of ∆
2
Q are positive.
19
From Lemma 2, we conclude that R(Q, x, y) discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly.
The discernment is categorical since we made no probabilistic assumptions. Fi-
nally, the discernment is physical, as follows from Lemma 1, the strong property
postulate, and the fact that Q is physical. 
We can now also prove
Theorem 2 For each state ρ of an assembly of two particles, the relationR′(Q, x, y)
discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly, probabilistically and physically; where Q
is the single-particle position operator; on the assumption of the Born rule.
Proof. We assume the Born rule. Then for any state ρ we have (cf. Equations
22, 23): 〈
∆2Q
〉
=
∑
i
pi
∫
d3x
∫
d3y |Ψi(x,y)|
2(x− y)2 , (24)
which is always positive (cf. Equation (17)). From Lemma 4, R′(Q, x, y) therefore
discerns weakly. The discernment is probabilistic, since we assumed the Born rule.
Finally, the discernment is physical, as follows from Lemma 3, the Born rule, and
the fact that Q is physical. 
It may be objected against the proofs of the foregoing two Theorems that I rely
too heavily on a technical feature of the assembly’s Hilbert space, namely that it
contains no states which exhibit no spread in (x− y)2. Effectively, unfavourable
cases for discernment have been ruled out of the assembly’s Hilbert space a priori.
But this objection is easily dealt with.
Theorem 3 If we permit two-particle states to be represented by measures as
well as by functions, then for all such states, either R(Q, x, y) or R(P, x, y)
discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly, categorically and physically; where Q
is the single-particle position operator, P is the single-particle momentum
operator; on the assumption of the strong projection postulate.
Proof. The guiding idea is that any state will exhibit spread in either relative
position or relative momentum, so no state is annihilated by both ∆2Q and ∆
2
P.
We now allow measures, as well as functions, to represent states of the assembly.
Recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that (∆2QΨ)(x,y) = 0 only if Ψ(x,y) = 0
whenever x 6= y. In this case Ψ(x,y) = f(x)δ(3)(x− y), for some measure f(x).
Note at this point that the two particles cannot be fermions, since Ψ(x,y) =
Ψ(y,x). We now move to the momentum basis by performing a Fourier transform
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on Ψ:
Ψ(k, l) =
∫
d3x
∫
d3y Ψ(x,y)e−ik.xe−il.y
=
∫
d3x
∫
d3y f(x)δ(3)(x− y)e−i(k.x+l.y)
=
∫
d3x f(x)e−i(k+l).x
= f(k + l). (25)
This yields
(∆2PΨ)(k, l) = (k− l)
2f(k+ l) , (26)
which is the zero function only if f(k + l) = 0 whenever k 6= l. But we can only
satisfy this requirement if f is the zero function. But in that case Ψ(x,y) is
the zero function, and so does not represent a state. So if (∆2QΨ)(x,y) is the zero
function, then (∆2PΨ)(k, l) can’t be. This result is easily extended to mixed states.
With this result and Lemma 2 we conclude that either R(Q, x, y) or R(P, x, y)
(or both) discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly. The discernment is categorical, since
we made no probabilistic assumptions. Finally, the discernment is physical, given
Lemma 1, the strong property postulate, and the fact that both Q and P are
physical. 
It only remains to state
Theorem 4 If we permit two-particle states to be represented by measures as
well as by functions, then for all such states, either R(Q, x, y) or R(P, x, y)
discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly, probabilistically and physically; where Q
is the single-particle position operator, P is the single-particle momentum
operator; on the assumption of the Born rule.
Proof: Left to the reader. 
So we have established the weak discernibility of indistinguishable particles
in any two-particle assembly. But my results are restricted to the two particle
case. Therefore, I now turn to the many-particle case, and present theorems for
assemblies of any number of particles.
21
4.5 Discernment for all many-particle states
I begin by defining a generalized N -particle variance operator for each single-
particle quantity A, for any N > 2. For any single-particle quantity A, define(
∆
(N)
A
)2
:= A2 − A
2
=
1
N
N∑
i
1⊗ · · ·A2i ⊗ · · ·1−
(
1
N
N∑
i
1⊗ · · ·Ai ⊗ · · ·1
)2
=
1
N2
N∑
i<j
(1⊗ · · ·Ai ⊗ · · ·1 − 1⊗ · · ·Aj ⊗ · · ·1)
2
. (27)
Note that
(
∆
(2)
A
)2
= ∆2A; cf. Equations (11) and (12).
Again, my strategy is to discern by setting A = Q, the single-particle position
operator. If we act on any wavefunction Ψ in
⊗N
L2(R3) with
(
∆
(N)
Q
)2
we obtain,
using (27),((
∆
(N)
Q
)2
Ψ
)
(x1, . . .xN ) =
1
N2
(
N∑
i<j
(xi − xj)
2
)
Ψ(x1, . . .xN) . (28)
Now it is clear from Equation (28) that we cannot proceed in the general case ex-
actly as we did in the two-particle case. That is: we cannot discern two particles—a
and b, say—by relying on the variance operator’s annihilating the wavefunction.
For, the vanishing of the right-hand side of Equation (28) is not a necessary con-
dition for a and b’s having vanishing relative distance: this relative distance may
be zero, and yet there may still be non-zero contributions from the other particles.
However, we need only make mild adjustments to our previous strategy. The
idea is to look at regions of the configuration space for which (xi−xj)
2 is constant,
except for when i or j equals a or b. We then indepedently vary xa and xb. If the
wavefunction is non-zero for xa 6= xb, then we find variation in the right-hand side
of Equation (28) which can only be attributed to a and b’s having non-vanishing
relative distance—i.e., to their being discernible.
We first define a new dyadic relation between particles:
D(N)(x, y) iff((
∆
(N)
Q
)2
Ψ
)
(x1, . . .xN) 6=
1
N2
N∑
i < j;
〈i, j〉 6= 〈x, y〉;
〈i, j〉 6= 〈y, x〉
(xi − xj)
2 Ψ(x1, . . .xN) . (29)
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Note that D(2)(x, y) iff R(Q, x, y); so D(2) is a physical relation. Is D(N) a physical
relation for any N? First we note that the N -particle variance operator for posi-
tion,
(
∆
(N)
Q
)2
, is a physical quantity, as is evident from its definition (27). Now we
need to make physical sense of the condition in the definition of D(N) (Equation
(29)).
Recall that R(A, x, y)’s defining condition is to the effect that the wavefunction
is not an eigenstate of the variance operator for some quantity (with eigenvalue
zero); with the strong property postulate, this entails that the assembly does not
have the corresponding physical property (namely, zero variance in that quantity).
Therefore, there can be no doubt that R’s defining condition is physically mean-
ingful (so long as the strong property postulate is valid). However, in the case
of D(N), the condition is not that Ψ not be an eigenstate; the condition is rather
that Ψ not be sent to some specific function by the N -particle variance operator
for position. The strong property postulate is therefore no help in giving D(N)’s
defining condition physical significance.
We must settle for probabilistic discernment. D(N)’s defining condition makes
perfect physical sense if we assume the Born rule, since then the condition could be
interpreted as the N -particle variance operator for position having an expectation
value not equal to the value specified in the right-hand side of Equation (29). We
can make this more explicit by defining another relation:
D′(N)(x, y) iff〈(
∆
(N)
Q
)2〉
6=
1
N2
∫
d3x1 · · ·
∫
d3xN
N∑
i < j;
〈i, j〉 6= 〈x, y〉;
〈i, j〉 6= 〈y, x〉
(xi − xj)
2 |Ψ(x1, . . .xN )|
2 . (30)
We may now prove
Thereom 5 For each state ρ of an assembly ofN particles, the relationD′(N)(x, y)
discerns any two distinct particles x and y weakly, probabilistically and phys-
ically, on the assumption of the Born rule.
Proof. We prove this only for pure states and zero spin; the extension to mixed
states and non-zero spin will be obvious, given our proof of Theorem 1.
It is clear that ¬D′(N)(x, x) for all x, since when x = y the right-hand side
of Equation (30) corresponds to the definition of the left-hand side (cf. Equation
(28)), and must therefore be equal to it. Thus D′(N) is irreflexive. To show that
D′(N) discerns any two particles weakly, we need to prove that D′(N)(x, y) holds
whenever x 6= y.
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This we do by reductio: assume that there are two particles a and b (a 6= b)
for which ¬D′(N)(a, b). Then we must have, by subtracting the right-hand side of
Equation (30) from its left-hand side:
1
N2
∫
d3x1 · · ·
∫
d3xN (xa − xb)
2 |Ψ(x1, . . .xN)|
2 = 0 . (31)
This holds only if Ψ(x1, . . .xN) = 0 whenever xa 6= xb. So
Ψ(x1, . . .xN) = f(x1, . . .xa, . . .xb−1,xb+1, . . .xN )δ
(3)(xa − xb),
where f is some 3(N − 1)-place function. But then Ψ is not a function, so it is
not a state in
⊗N
L2(R3). Thus D′(N)(a, b), and D′(N) weakly discerns any two
particles in the assembly.
The definition ofD′(N) involves taking an expectation value, so it discerns prob-
abilistically. Finally, the foregoing discussion establishes that D′(N) is a physical
relation. 
Finally, I present
Theorem 6 If we permit states of an assembly of N particles to be represented
by measures as well as by functions, then for all such states, either D′(x, y)
or its momentum analogue discerns any two particles x and y weakly, prob-
abilistically and physically, on the assumption of the Born rule.
Proof: Left to the reader. The method is to carry over to the N -particle case
the way in which proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 developed Theorems 1 and 2. 
5 Conclusion
Let me summarise the foregoing results. A strong version of Leibniz’s Principle of
the Identity of Indiscernibles fails for all particles. This version of the Principle
permits discernment of two objects only by monadic properties, or relations to
other objects not in the pair. However, a weaker (and still non-trivial) version of
the Principle is available, that was regimented by (HB) in Section 1.1. According
to this regimentation of the Principle, two particles may be discerned weakly, i.e. by
some relation that applies between the particles, but not reflexively to each. This
version of the Principle holds for all particles: fermions, bosons and paraparticles.
Previous attempts to establish this general result by Muller and Saunders
(2008) and Muller and Seevinck (2009) have been seen to fail, due to their surrepti-
tious use of mathematical predicates that can be given no physical interpretation.
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However, physical predicates can be found which secure the result. They de-
rive their physical significance from the single-particle position operator (and, if
needed, the single-particle momentum operator). In the case of two-particle assem-
blies, this discernment may be categorical—that is, independent of all probabilistic
assumptions—but we must assume the strong property postulate. For assemblies
of three of more particles, the discernment can only be probabilistic—that is, the
Born rule must be assumed—but with that caveat the conclusions of Saunders,
Muller and Seevinck are secured.
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